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Does Parental Autonomy Require Equal Custody at
Divorce?
Margaret F. Brinig*
This article considers the effect of amendments to state divorce
laws that strengthen their joint custody preference. It does so in the
context of suits by noncustodial parents challenging substantive
custody standards not requiring equal custody at divorce. The
complaint is that most custody laws, by using a "best interests"
standard rather than equally dividing custodial time, violate
substantive due process. Further, two states, Iowa and Maine, have
recently amended their custody legislation to strongly presume joint
physical custody.'
While the Oregon statutes that frame much of the discussion here,
like most state laws, do not state an explicit preference for joint
custody,2 shared custody is certainly encouraged by § 107.179,3
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* William G. Hammond Professor, Associate Dean for Faculty Development,
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1. See Iowa Code § 598.41 (2004) (enacted as Acts 2004 (80 G.A.) Ch. 1169
§ 1):
5. a. Ifjoint legal custody is awarded to both parents, the court may award
joint physical care to both custodial parents upon the request of either
parent. If the court denies the request for joint physical care, the
determination shall be accompanied by specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law that the awarding of joint physical care is not in the
best interest of the child.
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 1653 (2001): "If either or both parents request
an award of shared primary residential care and the court does not award
shared primary residential care of the child, the court shall state in its decision
the reasons why shared primary residential care is not in the best interest of the
child."
2. Joint custody is discussed at some length, and examples provided, in James
G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State Decision Making
About Their Relationships, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 845,911-12 (2003). Dwyer
notes that a "retreat" from joint custody "reflects a growing perception that 'true'
joint custody, whether physical or legal, though it can be beneficial to children,
often is not in a child's best interests, particularly when it is involuntarily imposed
on parents and/or when there is a high degree of conflict between the parents." Id.
at 911. See generally June Carbone, From Partners to Parents: The Second
Revolution in Family Law 188 (2000).
3. Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.179 (2004) provides in part:
(1) When either party to a child custody issue, other than one involving
temporary custody, whether the issue arises from a case of marital
annulment, dissolution or separation, or from a determination of paternity,
requests the court to grant joint custody of the minor children of the
parties under ORS 107.105, the court, if the other party objects to the
request for joint custody, shall proceed under this section. The request
under this subsection must be made, in the petition or the response, or
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which refers cases in which the parties cannot agree on joint custody
to mediation, and by § 107.105, which requires the court to consider
otherwise not less than 30 days before the date of trial in the case, except
for good cause shown. The court in such circumstances, except as
provided in subsection (3) of this section, shall direct the parties to
participate in mediation in an effort to resolve their differences concerning
custody. The court may order such participation in mediation within a
mediation program established by the court or as conducted by any
mediator approved by the court. Unless the court or the county provides
a mediation service available to the parties, the court may order that the
costs of the mediation be paid by one or both of the parties, as the court
finds equitable upon consideration of the relative ability of the parties to
pay those costs. If, after 90 days, the parties do not arrive at a resolution
of their differences, the court shall proceed to determine custody.
(2) At its discretion, the court may:
(a) Order mediation under this section prior to trial and postpone
trial of the case pending the outcome of the mediation, in which
case the issue of custody shall be tried only upon failure to resolve
the issue of custody by mediation;
(b) Order mediation under this section prior to trial and proceed to
try the case as to issues other than custody while the parties are at
the same time engaged in the mediation, in which case the issue of
custody shall be tried separately upon failure to resolve the issue of
custody by mediation; or
(c) Complete the trial of the case on all issues and order mediation
under this section upon the conclusion of the trial, postponing entry
of the judgment pending outcome of the mediation, in which case
the court may enter a limited judgment as to issues other than
custody upon completion of the trial or may postpone entry of any
decree until the expiration of the mediation period or agreement of
the parties as to custody.
(3) If either party objects to mediation on the grounds that to participate
in mediation would subject the party to severe emotional distress and
moves the court to waive mediation, the court shall hold a hearing on the
motion. If the court finds it likely that participation in mediation will
subject the party to severe emotional distress, the court may waive the
requirement of mediation.
4. Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.105 (2003) provides in relevant part:
(1) Whenever the court renders a judgment of marital annulment,
dissolution or separation, the court may provide in the judgment:
(a) For the future care and custody, by one party or jointly, of all
minor children of the parties born, adopted or conceived during the
marriage, and for minor children born to the parties prior to the
marriage, as the court may deem just and proper under ORS
107.137. The court may hold a hearing to decide the custody issue
prior to any other issues. When appropriate, the court shall
recognize the value of close contact with both parents and
encourage joint parental custody and joint responsibility for the
welfare of the children.
(b) For parenting time rights of the parent not having custody of
such children, and for visitation rights pursuant to a petition filed
under ORS 109.119. When a parenting plan has been developed as
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awarding custodyjointly. In addition, 1997 Oregon legislation noted
in its very first section that it was state policy to "[a]ssure minor
children... frequent and continuing contact with parents who have
shown the ability to act in the best interests of the child."5 The
legislation has strengthened the power of noncustodial parents. The
denial of access to the children would give the right to terminate
spousal support, change the parenting plan, or obtain an award for
"makeup" visitation.6 The legislative history for the bill shows that
required by ORS 107.102, the court shall review the parenting plan
and, ifapproved, incorporate the parenting plan into the court's final
order. When incorporated into a final order, the parenting plan is
determinative of parenting time rights. If the parents have been
unable to develop a parenting plan or if either of the parents
requests the court to develop a detailed parenting plan, the court
shall develop the parenting plan in the best interest of the child,
ensuring the noncustodial parent sufficient access to the child to
provide for appropriate quality parenting time and assuring the
safety of the parties, if implicated. The court may deny parenting
time to the noncustodial parent under this subsection only if the
court finds that parenting time would endanger the health or safety
of the child. The court shall recognize the value of close contact
with both parents and encourage, when practicable, joint
responsibility for the welfare of such children and extensive contact
between the minor children of the divided marriage and the parties.
If the court awards parenting time to a noncustodial parent who has
committed abuse, the court shall make adequate provision for the
safety of the child and the other parent in accordance with the
provisions of ORS 107.718 (4).
5. 1997 Or. Laws page no. 707 (S.B. 243) § 1(1).
6. Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.434 (2003) provides in part:
(2) In addition to any other remedy the court may impose to enforce the
provisions of a judgment relating to the parenting plan, the court may:
(a) Modify the provisions relating to the parenting plan by:
(A) Specifying a detailed parenting time schedule;
(B) Imposing additional terms and conditions on the existing
parenting time schedule; or
(C) Ordering additional parenting time, in the best interests of the
child, to compensate for wrongful deprivation of parenting time;
(b) Order the party who is violating the parenting plan provisions to
post bond or security;
(c) Order either or both parties to attend counseling or educational
sessions that focus on the impact of violation of the parenting plan on
children;
(d) Award the prevailing party expenses, including, but not limited to,
attorney fees, filing fees and court costs, incurred in enforcing the
party's parenting plan;
(e) Terminate, suspend or modify spousal support;
(f) Terminate, suspend or modify child support as provided in ORS
107.431; or
(g) Schedule a hearing for modification of custody as provided in
ORS 107.135 (11).
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it was a compromise between men's rights groups and those
concerned about domestic violence.7
After setting out the constitutional problem and describing the
legislation in some detail, this article tests the effects of the change
in the Oregon statutes. Policy-makers might well want to know how
children fare under joint custody as opposed to other possible
visitation arrangements. In other words, does the child's best
interests, the hallmark of most current statutes, require joint custody?
Policy-makers might also question whether the stronger legislative
preference really increases joint custody awards. Does its
requirement that mediation alternatives be suggested, and in some
cases ordered, in fact increase the number of cases that are settled by
mediation? Do judges sometimes prescribe mediation in cases that
are inappropriate (such as those in which domestic violence orders
have been entered)? Do children receive less child support under the
7. One of the father's rights groups that lists S.B. 243 as a piece of "father
friendly" legislation is Fathers Online, available at http://www.peak.org/
-jedwards/fafr97.htm#243.
William J. Howe III, Chair, Oregon Task Force on Family Law, testified on April
4, 1997, before the Senate Business Law and Government Committee. The
testimony available at http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/legislative/legislativeminutes/
1997%20LEGIS%20WEB/4th%201ayer/senate.blg.html/sblg.404.html. He
discussed the tension between "dad's rights" groups and domestic violence
prevention groups and claimed that the legislation (S.B. 243) was a compromise.
During the House Judiciary subcommittee hearings on the same matter, Rep.
Michael Fahey introduced H. R. 3172 on April 3, 1997 proposing that "may" be
changed to "shall" for joint custody consideration. Rep. Fahey appeared in the
show "Father's Issues, Family Issues" on October 31, 1996. Fahey's testimony on
April 3 shows that he believed that unless the judge had "hard facts to the contrary,"
joint custody should be awarded. The testimony is available at
http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/legislative/legislativeminutes/ 997%20LEGIS%20
WEB/4th%201ayer/house.jud.htmlihjudfl.403.html. The language changing "may"
to "shall" was added to S. Res. 243, and now appears as part of 107.105 (1).
"It sets clearly a policy that in the absence of abuse or neglect, that it's important
for children to have both parents in their lives," said Jackson County Judge Orf. "It
now becomes the policy of the state." Maya Blackmun, Divorce Laws Aim To
Protect Children, The Oregonian, Sept. 28, 1997, at BO 1. "The law also spells out
the possible penalties for thwarting visitation-such as cutting alimony or child
support, or ordering makeup visitation time or a hearing to change custody-for
families and judges to better understand." In another article, Jeff Mapes,
Lawmakers Put More Parenting In Divorce, The Oregonian, June 25, 1997, atB0l,
noted:
A bill to help both parents have a role in raising their children after a
divorce won final approval Tuesday in the Oregon Legislature.... Senate
Bill 243 would give judges more power to enforce visitation rights for
noncustodial parents, even to the point of stopping child and spousal
support payments. It also would require divorcing couples to develop
parenting plans.
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new statutory scheme? Is there evidence that the process makes
divorce less painful and less expensive? The broader goal here is to
suggest that changes in family law, while often made, are seldom
systematically assessed. Society needs such accountability,
particularly when children are involved. This article shows how it
might be done.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM
The underlying constitutional query is whether the "parents'
rights" approach that the Supreme Court has recently found
fundamental trumps the "best interests" test states use in custody
litigation. If it does, the current statutes are unconstitutional. The
challengers posit that only an equal share of physical custody time
will satisfy their constitutional right to direct the upbringing and
control of their children! So far, the answer given by the courts is
8. The complaints in each of the fifty suits are approximately the same. For
one example, see the complaint in Urso v. Illinois, 04-CV-6056 (N.D. Ill.,
Kennelly, J.), dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Oct. 7, 2004), pp.
11-12:
The United States Supreme Court has long and consistently held that the
care, custody, maintenance, management, companionship, educational
choices, and general child-rearing decisions related to one's children are
fundamental rights protected by the Federal Constitution.
As such, any actions by any person or entity, whether it be by a person
acting alone, in conjunction with another, directly or indirectly, by any
State entity, or demonstrated by a pattern of deprivations generally
attributable to the State itself, that intrude upon these fundamental rights,
are patently unconstitutional until, and unless, first validated by a
substantially compelling State interest applied with strict scrutiny, and
only performed in the least intrusive manner.
The State is not permitted to intrude upon these fundamental rights of the
natural parent without clear and convincing proof of demonstrable harm
to the child(ren) in question.
All natural parents existing under the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois
are constitutionally entitled to be free of government intrusion in the care,
custody, and maintenance of their children, unless there is clear and
convincing evidence of proven harm, or of the threat or danger of such
harm, to the minor children in question.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently reminded that there is
a presumption that fit parents act in their children's best interests, and that
there is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private
realm of the family to further question fit parents' ability to make the best
decisions regarding their children.
Id. Other examples include Creed et al. v. Wisconsin, 04-00917 (E.D. Wis.)
(Curran, J.), Ward et al. v. Louisiana, 04-CV-2697 (E.D. La.) (Fulton, J.), and
Martin et al. v. Florida, 04-CV-22385 (S.D. Fla. Jordan, J.). A comprehensive set
of links can be found on the website for the Indiana Civil Rights Council,
http://www.indianacrc.org/classaction.html (last visited June 10, 2005).
13492005]
1350 LOUISIANA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 65
that, for a variety of reasons, the parental rights must yield to the
children's.
For many years, the Supreme Court has opined that parenting is
a fundamental right, that is, a right that cannot be significantly
diminished or abrogated without a compelling state interest.9 Most
The petition for certiorari in Arnold v. Arnold, which the Supreme Court
dismissed at 125 S. Ct. 112 (2004), can be found at 2004 WL 1634531. Arnoldwas
an appeal from a denial of a Wisconsin Court of Appeals case reported as Arnold
v. Arnold, 679 N.W.2d 296 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin denied review. 691 N.W.2d 354 (Wis. 2005). Arnoldraises many of the
same issues as do the federal court cases, but in the guise of an appeal from the
granting of a 102 day per year partial custody by a state trial court rather than the
equal (182.5) days requested.
9. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000) (finding statute
violated due process when it allowed visitation petitions to be brought by any one
at any time and required parent to demonstrate that visitation was not in the child's
best interests); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992)
(stating that though custody and divorce proceedings normally cannot be brought
in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, tort suit for abuse by the father could
lay in federal court); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989)
(holding that even a biological father could not overcome the conclusive
presumption of paternity held by the mother's husband over her objection);
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield 490 U.S. 30, 109 S. Ct. 1597
(1989) (holding that Indian Child Welfare Act required that tribe be allowed to
decide dispute between biological Indian and adoptive non-Indian parents); Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984) (finding that a fit parent cannot be
deprived of custody based on racial classifications); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983) (holding that biological father needed to grasp the
opportunity to have a role in his child's life); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982) (stating that before parental rights could be terminated, state
required to show parents' unfitness by at least a clear and convincing standard);
Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981) (holding that
because of the importance of the relationship, the state could not terminate the
rights of mother without providing her counsel in complicated cases); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972) (holding that a state could not
conclusively presume that an unwed but involved biological father was unfit to
have custody of his children after their mother's death); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972) (holding that parents' right to direct and control the
education of their children meant that Amish parents who offered a long tradition
of education in domestic arts and farming were exempt from compulsory education
statutes for the two years following elementary school); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct. 1509 (1968) (holding that a state could not make status to sue for
wrongful death of a parent depend upon whether biological parents had married);
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S. Ct. 840 (1953) (finding that because of the
importance of custody, state could not award custody to parent without personal
jurisdiction); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944) (stating
that though parent is free to direct the upbringing of her child, she cannot claim the
first amendment allows the child to become a "martyr" by violating child labor and
hour laws); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 220-21, 54 S. Ct. 181, 188
(1933) (Stone, J., dissenting) (stating that a child living with grandmother could not
bring suit against father in federal court based on divorce agreement with mother
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of the Court's pronouncements have involved state incursions into
the province of the parent, 0 or at least non-parent party interference
with the family." Many of the cases have insisted that decisions
about custody be made by state courts because an established
"domestic relations" exception to diversity jurisdiction. 2
that he had honored); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571
(1925) (holding that compulsory education statutes unconstitutionally limited
permitted schooling to public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,43 S. Ct.
625 (1923) (holding that a state forbidding teaching of modem foreign languages
impermissibly interfered with teacher's occupation and parents' right to direct
children's education). See also Gonzales ex rel. Gonzales v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338,
1352 (1 lth Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1270, 120 S. Ct. 2737 (2000). For an
analysis of the early cases, see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?
Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992)
(stating that early cases established that parents, as opposed to the state, "owned"
the child). For a discussion of the rights of unwed fathers, see Laura Orem, The
Paradox of Unmarried Fathers, 11 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 47 (2004). See
also David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the
Faultless Father, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 753 (1999). For a view that "the law governing
every decision reflects a mix of concerns for the interests of children and adults,"
see Dwyer, supra note 2, at 846.
10. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 109 S. Ct. 1597 and Santosky, 455 U.S. 745,
102 S. Ct. 1388 (both cases discussing parental rights termination); Lehr, 463 U.S.
248, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (terminating unwed father's parental rights); Stanley, 405 U.S.
645, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (adhering to presumption that unwed father was unfit to assume
custody of children on mother's death); Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526
(finding state court jurisdiction over adoption by non-Indian of Indian child); Levy,
391 U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct. 1509 (deciding wrongful death statute's treatment of children
of unwed parents); Prince, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438 (enforcing child labor and
hour laws).
11. Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (deciding visitation rights of
grandparents or "any person" seeking visitation); Michael H., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.
Ct. 2333 (deciding parental rights of unmarried biological father seeking parental
rights of child conceived in adulterous relationship).
12. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Eichingerv. Eichinger, No. 04-80,
2005 WL 406071 (ruling below, 02C0 1-9903-DR-259 from the Allen C. Cir. Ct.,
aff'dlnd. Ct. App. 2004, 31 Fam. L. Rep. 1191 (2/22/05)):
Divorced father whose ex-wife was awarded sole custody of their child
did not set forth any argument how Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8, which
authorizes trial court to determine custody and enter custody order in
accordance with best interests of child, operates to treat him differently
from similarly situated parties, and thus did not show that it violates equal
protection; statute's 'best interest of child' standard constitutes compelling
state interest that justifies resultant interference with rights of biological
parents, and thus does not violate substantive due process.
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703-04, 112 S. Ct. at 2214-15 (1992). Although a tort
suit was permitted:
[T]he domestic relations exception, as articulated by this Court since
Barber, divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and
child custody decrees. Given the long passage of time without any
expression of congressional dissatisfaction, we have no trouble today
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Furthermore, even federal statutes respect the decisions of other
states regarding custody.13
The states, however, have taken radically different approaches to
family cases dealing with the same subject matter. While Florida has
recently decided that a same-sex couple does not have an equal
protection claim that will trump a statute prohibiting them from
adopting, 4 courts in states like New Jersey have found that not
allowing such couples to adopt would violate state policies against
non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 15
The tradition of deferring to state courts in disputed custody
actions began many years ago. For example, in the early nineteen
reaffirming the validity of the exception as it pertains to divorce and
alimony decrees and child custody orders ... Moreover, as a matter of
judicial expertise, it makes far more sense to retain the rule that federal
courts lack power to issue these types of decrees because of the special
proficiency developed by state tribunals over the past century and a half
in handling issues that arise in the granting of such decrees.
Id. Elk Grove Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2309 (2004):
One of the principal areas in which this Court has customarily declined to
intervene is the realm of domestic relations. Long ago we observed that
'[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent
and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the
United States.
Id. (citing In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-594, 10 S. Ct. 850 (1890)). See also
Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587, 109 S. Ct. 2023 (1989) ("[D]omestic
relations are preeminently matters of state law."); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,
435, 99 S. Ct. 2371 (1979) ("Family relations are a traditional area of state
concern."); Ankenbradt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992) ("So
strong is our deference to state law in this area that we have recognized a 'domestic
relations exception' that 'divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce,
alimony, and child custody decrees."').
13. Although the Parenting Kidnapping and Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1738A (Supp. 2000), requires the states to give Full Faith and Credit to valid
foreign custody decrees, the point is to strengthen the effect of a valid first decision
of the child's "home state." See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 598B.102 et seq. (2001)
(Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act). For one state's description
of the effect of the act, see New York Divorce and Family Law, avialable at
http://www.brandeslaw.com/uccjea/anoverview-of the uniform child.htm. See
also People of New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 612 67 S. Ct.
903, 905 (1947) (stating that pre-UCCJEA, it was permissible to modify an out of
state order ifa change in circumstances occurred); Yarborough, 290 U.S. at 220-21,
54 S. Ct. at 188 (Stone, J., dissenting)
14. Lofton v. Roe, 358 F.3d 804, 807 (1 1th. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
869 (2005) (upholding statute prohibiting adoption by same-sex parents despite
equal protection claim). Similarly, the Baby M. case was not decided by the
Supreme Court despite the tremendous popular interest it generated Matter ofBaby
M, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
15. See, e.g., In re J.M.G., 532 A.2d 550, 554 (N.J. Super., Chan. Div., 1993)
(citing cases from a number of other states and rejecting an argument of others'
discrimination quite similar to that made in Palmore, discussed infra).
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sixties, the Supreme Court decided a case where the parents had been
issued conflicting orders by two states, and noted that, left to their
own devices, these parents could not make a decision in their child's
best interests:
Virginia law, like that of probably every State in the Union,
requires the court to put the child's interest first. The
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has stated this policy
with unmistakable clarity: "In Virginia, we have established
the rule that the welfare of the infant is the primary,
paramount, and controlling consideration of the court in all
controversies between parents over the custody of their minor
children. All other matters are subordinate." Mullen v.
Mullen, 188 Va. 259, 269, 49 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1948).
Unfortunately, experience has shown that the question of
custody, so vital to a child's happiness and well-being,
frequently cannot be left to the discretion of parents. This is
particularly true where, as here, the estrangement of husband
and wife beclouds parental judgment with emotion and
prejudice.16
Consistent with the third party and intrafamily distinction made
previously, the Ford Court noted the difference between cases in
which outside litigants sought to intrude in matters of family privacy:
"All of the Virginia cases discussed by the South Carolina court,
however, involved purely private controversies which private
litigants can settle, and none involved the custody of children where
the public interest is strong."' 7
In those cases involving only custody at divorce-in other words,
between the two parents themselves-May v. Anderson, 8 Palmore
v. Sidoti9 and Elk Grove Sch. Dist. v. Newdow20 stand out because
the Court necessarily became involved. In each of these, the Court
intervened only because there was a constitutional prohibition against
what the lower court had done. In Palmore, the lower court made a
custody determination based on the race of the child's step-parent.
In May v. Anderson the court determined there was a
constitutionally-based jurisdictional defect where the husband was
given custody where the court did not have personal jurisdiction over
the wife." Finally, in Newdow the Court determined that the father,
16. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193, 83 S. Ct. 273, 276-77 (1962).
17. Id. at 192.
18. 345 U.S. 528, 73 S. Ct. 840 (1953).
19. 466 U.S. 429, 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984).
20. 542 U.S. 1, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
21. 345 U.S. at 533-34, 73 S. Ct. at 842. The Court noted:
In Estin v. Estin and Kreiger v. Kreiger this Court upheld the validity of
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who did not have legal custody over the child in question under a
California decision could not challenge the Pledge of Allegiance on
her behalf, so the Court ultimately declined to answer the substantive
First Amendment question. Otherwise, in all three opinions the Court
implied it would not get involved. The Newdow Court, in fact,
directly disclaimed the power to second-guess the California court's
determination of the underlying custody matter,22 and deferred to the
Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of California law.23 The opinion
states:
One of the principal areas in which this Court has customarily
declined to intervene is the realm of domestic relations. Long
ago we observed that '[t]he whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the
laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.'
a Nevada divorce obtained ex parte by a husband, resident in Nevada,
insofar as it dissolved the bonds of matrimony. At the same time, we held
Nevada powerless to cut off, in that proceeding, a spouse's right to
financial support under the prior decree of another state. In the instant
case, we recognize that a mother's right to custody of her children is a
personal right entitled to at least as much protection as her right to
alimony (footnote omitted).
Id.
22. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989), the
dispute was between one birth parent and the other (and her husband) over custodial
rights to the child, Victoria. The Court maintained that the birth father did not have
standing in this "hopefully untypical" situation, in deference to the intact family of
the remarried mother. Id. at 111, 109 S. Ct. 2334. In concurring, Justice Stevens
suggested that the child's perspective and rights also needed to be considered. Id.
at 132, 109 S. Ct. 2347.
23. 542 U.S. at 1, 124 S. Ct. at 2311. The Court noted:
Newdow's parental status is defined by California's domestic relations
law. Our custom on questions of state law ordinarily is to defer to the
interpretation of the Court of Appeals for the Circuit in which the State is
located. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 346-47, 96 S. Ct. 2074
(1976). In this case, the Court of Appeals, which possesses greater
familiarity with California law, concluded that state law vests in Newdow
a cognizable right to influence his daughter's religious upbringing.
Newdow II, 313 F.3d, at 504-505. The court based its ruling on two
intermediate state appellate cases holding that 'while the custodial parent
undoubtedly has the right to make ultimate decisions concerning the
child's religious upbringing, a court will not enjoin the noncustodial
parent from discussing religion with the child or involving the child in his
or her religious activities in the absence of a showing that the child will be
thereby harmed.'
Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Murga, 103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 498, 505, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 79, 82 (1980)). See also In re Marriage of Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d 260,
268-70, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843, 849-50 (1983) (relying on Murga to invalidate portion
of restraining order barring noncustodial father from engaging children in religious
activity or discussion without custodial parent's consent).
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So strong is our deference to state law in this area that we
have recognized a 'domestic relations exception' that 'divests
the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and
child custody decrees.' We have also acknowledged that it
might be appropriate for the federal courts to decline to hear
a case involving 'elements of the domestic relationship,' even
when divorce, alimony, or child custody is not strictly at
issue:
This would be so when a case presents 'difficult questions
of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public
import whose importance transcends the result in the case
then at bar.' Such might well be the case if a federal suit was
filed prior to effectuation of a divorce, alimony, or child
custody decree, and the suit depended on a determination of
the status of the parties.
Thus, while rare instances arise in which it is necessary to
answer a substantial federal question that transcends or exists
apart from the family law issue in general it is appropriate for
the federal courts to leave delicate issues of domestic
relations to the state courts.24
The general substantive custody law of each state would seem
exactly such a "delicate issue," so long as not explicitly based upon
race, as in Palmore, or gender, as in the alimony case of Orr v. Orr."
The matters of custody remain firmly subjects of state domestic law.
The earlier case of May v. Anderson26 illustrates both the
importance of custody and the individual state's interest in children.
A husband and wife married in Wisconsin, agreed when they
separated in 1946 that the wife should take the children to Ohio to
think things over.27 When she decided not to return, her husband
filed for divorce and custody in Wisconsin; the wife was served in
Ohio.28 She never took part in the Wisconsin proceedings and her
husband was granted not only the divorce (concededly valid), but
also custody; the wife received visitation. 9 After some years under
this arrangement, the husband took the children to Ohio to visit the
24. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 1, 124 S. Ct. at 2309 (citations ommitted).
25. 440 U.S. 268, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979) (invalidating an Alabama law allowing
alimony awards to wives, but not to husbands). The Louisiana custody case
invalidating the use of gender, as opposed to the "real life fact" is Suire v.
Jagneaux, 422 So.2d 572 (La. App. 3d 1982). The Oregon case denying the use of
gender alone where all other things were equal is Sweat v. Coughtry, 969 P.2d 399,
400 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (holding custody nonetheless went to mother).
26. 345 U.S. 528, 73 S. Ct. 840 (1953).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 530-31, 73 S. Ct. at 841-42.
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wife where she subsequently refused to return them. The husband's
habeas corpus petition was ultimately unsuccessful, with the Supreme
Court holding that the ex parte proceeding was not effective to get
Wisconsin "the personal jurisdiction that it must have in order to
deprive [the] mother of her personal right to [the] immediate
possession [of her children]."3
Palmore v. Sidoti3 is a Supreme Court pronouncement that is
perhaps noncustodial parents' strongest suit in these legal challenges.
There, both divorcing parents were fit custodians, but the mother had
been the primary caretaker for the child's entire life.3" After the
divorce, the mother, who was white, married a black man.33 The
Florida lower court worried that continued placement with the
Palmores, who lived in a black neighborhood, might disadvantage the
child:
This Court feels that despite the strides that have been made
in bettering relations between the races in this country, it is
inevitable that Melanie will, if allowed to remain in her
present situation and attains school age and thus more
vulnerable to peer pressures, suffer from the social
stigmatization that is sure to come.34
The court noted that "[t]he judgment of a state court determining or
reviewing a child custody decision is not ordinarily a likely candidate
for review by this Court."35 However, the statement about the
damaging impact of the neighborhood "raises important federal
concerns arising from the Constitution's commitment to eradicating
discrimination based on race., 36
However, Palmore ultimately will turn out to be unhelpful for
plaintiffs in the new class action cases. Despite what plaintiffs would
claim about the primacy of parental interests, 37 the Court noted that
30. Id. at 534, 73 S. Ct. at 843.
31. 466 U.S. 429, 432, 104 S. Ct. 1879, 1881-82 (1984).
32. Id., 104 S. Ct. at 1882.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 431, 104 S. Ct. 1881.
36. Id. at 432, 104 S. Ct. 1882.
37. See, e.g., Arnold v. Arnold, 679 N.W.2d 296 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). Law
review articles urging this position, for joint legal custody, include: James W.
Bozzomo, Note, Joint Legal Custody: Parent's Constitutional Right in a
RecognizedFamily, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 547 (2002); Holly L. Robinson, Note, Joint
Custody: Constitutional Imperatives, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 27, 40 (1985) (writing
about joint decision-making rather than residential custody). Most states now offer
a presumption ofjoint legal custody if fitness isn't involved. In most situations, an
award of joint legal custody will present as direct a threat to the well-being of
children as will their joint placement. But see, Elk Grove Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
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"[t]he court correctly stated that the child's welfare was the
controlling factor. But that court was entirely candid and made no
effort to place its holding on any ground other than race."38 The court
went on to state:
The State, of course, has a duty of the highest order to protect
the interests of minor children, particularly those of tender
542 U.S. 1, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2310 (2004). In Newdow, Justice Stevens points out
the potential harm to pliintiff's child, who seems in a position opposed to that of
her father, who challenged "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, and who did
not have decision-making authority under the California custody decree:
This case concerns not merely Newdow's interest in inculcating his child
with his views on religion, but also the rights of the child's mother as a
parent generally and under the Superior Court orders specifically. And
most important, it implicates the interests of a young child who finds
herself at the center of a highly public debate over her custody, the
propriety of a widespread national ritual, and the meaning of our
Constitution.
Id. One Note that supports the joint-custody-as-fundamental-right position is Ellen
Canacakos, Joint Custody as a Fundamental Right, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 785 (1981),
though she admits that "Courts and commentators are unable to agree on exactly
what mix of legal and physical custody constitutes the joint custody arrangement,"
Id. at 787, n. 18, and that "the essence of joint custody [is] ... the sharing, by both
parents of responsibility and authority concerning the children." Id. at 788, n. 18.
She justifies her position on the grounds that the protection of parental rights
"derives not from the family unit per se but from the rights of individuals within the
family." Id. at 789. "Upon divorce, each parent will continue to possess this
fundamental right of parental autonomy equally because, even though the family
has been dissolved, each parent still retains those 'family-like' bonds ... recognized
by the Court as essential to the right." Id. at 791. This reasoning does not seem to
agree precisely with the later position ofthe Supreme Court in Michael H., 491 U.S.
110, 123, 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341 (1989):
As we view them, they rest not upon such isolated factors but upon the
historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a
term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the
unitary family. In Stanley, for example, we forbade the destruction of
such a family when, upon the death of the mother, the State had sought to
remove children from the custody of a father who had lived with and
supported them and their mother for 18 years. As Justice Powell stated for
the plurality in Moore v. East Cleveland, supra, 431 U.S., at 503, 97 S.
Ct., at 1938: "Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."
Thus, the legal issue in the present case reduces to whether the
relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria has
been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of our
society, or whether on any other basis it has been accorded special
protection. We think it impossible to find that it has. In fact, quite to the
contrary, our traditions have protected the marital family (Gerald, Carole,
and the child they acknowledge to be theirs) against the sort of claim
Michael asserts.
38. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432, 104 S. Ct. 1879, 1881-82 (1984).
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years. In common with most states, Florida law mandates
that custody determinations be made in the best interests of
the children involved. The goal of granting custody based on
the best interests of the child is indisputably a substantial
governmental interest for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause.39
The court concluded: "The effects of racial prejudice, however real,
cannotjustify a racial classification removing an infant child from the
custody of its natural mother found to be an appropriate person to
have such custody."4
Thus, as a matter of constitutional law, the best interests of the
child, protected by the state, should prevail over the constitutional
interests of either of the competing parents. Having briefly examined
the constitutional reasons why equal joint placement may not be
appropriate, the article turns to other, economic arguments.
1I. AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
The new concept in institutional economics that is the most
helpful in our discussion of divorcing families is the idea of the
externality.4 Economists, including Ronald Coase, usually describe
an externality as an effect on people who were not direct parties to a
transaction.4 Two people are, for example, parties to a contract
involving the making of cement. The cement plant is located in a
neighborhood, which suffers from the noise, dust, wear, tear, and
danger presented by the cement trucks. The ill-effects suffered by the
neighbors are externalities; much of the literature in economics and
in law and economics involves making the parties to such a contract
internalize these ill-effects. Sometimes this is done through
government regulation or sometimes by giving people in the position
39. Id. at 433, 104 S. Ct. at 1882-83 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 434, 104 S. Ct. at 1883.
41. Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modem Approach 545-46
(1993); D. McCloskey, The Applied Theory of Price 331 (2d ed, 1985).
42. In The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960), Ronald H. Coase
proposed what is popularly called the "Coase Theorem." Coase's proposition, at
least in its incarnation that people should bargain to an efficient outcome regardless
of the way the law allocates rights, was first applied to changes in divorce laws in
H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage andDivorce: Informational Constraints andPrivate
Contracting, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 437 (1986) (proposing no increase in rates, but
changes in alimony and property distribution). Compare the above with language
from Elk Grove Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2312:
In our view, it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by a
plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in
dispute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the
person who is the source of the plaintiffs claimed standing.
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of the neighbors the right to sue. Thus, the contract may become less
than fully enforceable where there are substantial negative third party
effects.4  Although most contracts affect third parties, at least
indirectly, sometimes the contracting parties, like those involved in
the cement factory transaction, must buy-off the affected outsiders."
So long as compensation takes place,45 the contract remains efficient
and enforceable. When the costs to the third party or parties are too
high, the contract may be prohibited criminally,' enjoined,47 or just
not enforced.48
The concept of externalities can be imported into family law. For
example, children of divorce suffer substantial negative
externalities, 9 so much so, that we may make it more difficult for the
43. For example, Professor Epstein has written that the only sound justification
for inalienability is "the practical control ofexternalities." Richard A. Epstein, Why
Restrain Alienation?, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 970,990 (1985) (stating that externalities
which are usually present when resources must be shared); In Richard A. Epstein,
Surrogacy: The Casefor Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2305,2315
(1995), Epstein writes that "the legal response should be to ban or restructure those
transactions whose negative third-party consequences outweigh the gains to the
transacting parties, . . .[when] gains and losses are measured by a compensation
criterion." See also June Carbone, The Role of Contract Principles in Determining
the Validity of Surrogacy Contracts, 28 Santa Clara L. Rev. 581, 582 (1988)
(arguing in favor of enforcement so that genetic fathers can enter the agreements
with confidence in the certainty of the outcome).
44. In situations where they do, the contract becomes Pareto-optimal. For
discussions of Pareto optimality, see Jack Hirschleifer, Price Theory and
Applications 496-97 (4th ed. 1988) and Varian, supra note 41, at 262-63.
45. At least the compensation occurs theoretically, according to Kaldor-Hicks
optimality. See, e.g., P.R.G. Layard & A.A.Walters, Microeconomic Theory 32
(1978); Varian, supra note 41, at 218. The original articles are Nicholas Kaldor,
Welfare Properties of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49
Econ. J. 549-51 (1939) and J.R. Hicks, The Valuation of Social Income, 7
Economica 105-24 (1940).
46. This would include such conduct as drag-racing, which is popularly called
"chicken." See, e.g., In re Fox, 395 N.E.2d 918 (Ohio Com. P1. 1979). For a game
theoretic explanation, see Charles Goetz, Law and Economics 15-17 (1984).
47. This is the case in nuisance situations. See, e.g., Hart v. Wagner, 184 Md.
40, 40 A.2d 47 (1944).
48. I develop this proposition at some length in Margaret F. Brinig, A
Maternalistic Approach to Surrogacy, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2377 (1995).
49. As the Newdow Court noted:
This case concerns not merely Newdow's interest in inculcating his child
with his views on religion, but also the rights of the child's mother as a
parent generally and under the Superior Court orders specifically. And
most important, it implicates the interests of a young child who finds
herself at the center of a highly public debate over her custody, the
propriety of a widespread national ritual, and the meaning of our
Constitution.
542 U.S. 1, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2310 (2004). For similar social science conclusions,
see Judith S. Wallerstein & Sandra Blakeslee, Second Chances: Men, Women and
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parents to divorce." We try to make things easier for these children
by requiring child support to the standard of living they would have
enjoyed if their parents remained together.5' In some states, the court
may order the divorcing parents to provide the children a college
education that children with married parents cannot claim.52
The difference we have already explored in the constitutional
context between the two types of case (where courts may or may not
interfere without a showing of parental unfitness) can be explained
in economic terms by the presence or absence of third-party
externalities.53 Parents in nearly all divorce cases that involve third-
party externalities will be making decisions that affect children. As
in some of the post-Troxel grandparent visitation statute cases,
divorcing parents may not be acting in their children's best
interests, 4 but rather putting their own needs and interests first.5
Children a Decade after Divorce (1989); Mavis Hetherington, et al., Effects of
Divorce on Parents and Children, in Nontraditional Families: Parenting and Child
Development (Michael E. Lamb. ed., 1982); Mavis Hetherington, et al., Long-Term
Effects ofDivorce andRemarriage on the Adjustment of Children, 24 J. Am. Acad.
Child Psychiatry 518 (1985); Judith S. Wallerstein, The Long-Term Effects of
Divorce on Children: A Review, 30 J. Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent Psychiatry
349 (1991). A less formal account is presented in Barbara Dafoe Whitehead's
article, Dan Quayle Was Right: Harmful Effects ofDivorce on Children, 271 The
Atlantic Monthly 47 (April 1993).
50. Va. Code Ann. § 20-91 (2004). See also Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational
Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L. Rev. 9 (1990); Barbara
Defoe Whitehead, A New Familism, Fam. Aff. 1, 5 (1992).
51. Cole v. Cole, 44 Md. App. 435,409 A.2d 734 (1979); Conway v. Conway,
395 S.E.2d 464 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
52. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Crocker, 971 P.2d 469 (Or. Ct. App. 1998);
Rohn v. Thuma, 408 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). Of course, money (and even
higher education) does not buy happiness. The requirement that the noncustodial
parent pay for college might palliate the pain of divorce somewhat.
53. For a slightly more extended discussion, see Margaret F. Brinig, From
Contract to Covenant: Beyond the Law and Economics of the Family 9 (2000).
54. Dwyer, supra note 2, at 909-25 (suggesting that the standards are
sometimes manipulated to simply count along with the rights of parents).
55. See. e.g., Constance v. Traill, 98-2758 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999), 736 So.2d
971 (finding joint custody inappropriate); Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019
(N.Y. 1978) (also findingjoint custody inappropriate); Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63,
72 (N.J. 1981). In Beck the court stated that even though the alternating custody
order was affirmed:
The necessity for at least minimal parental cooperation in a joint custody
arrangement presents a thorny problem ofjudicial enforcement in a case
such as the present one, wherein despite the trial court's determination that
joint custody is in the best interests of the child, one parent (here, the
mother) nevertheless contends that cooperation is impossible and refuses
to abide by the decree.
Id. The parties in Beck, after 10 years, are still litigating. Beck v. Beck, 570 A.2d
1273 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). See also In re Marriage of Heinze, 631
N.E.2d 728 (I11. App. Ct. 1994). See generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annot. Propriety
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Sometimes courts will use this mixed-motives decision-making
as grounds for awarding benefits that children of married parents do
not enjoy. For example, In re Marriage of Crocker 6 found that
although noncustodial fathers paying for their children's college
education were members of a "true class,"57 the legislature could
rationally decide that divorced parents of college-aged children might
be ordered to pay their college expenses:
We conclude that the statutory distinction is rational. Even
if most divorced or separated parents could cooperate
sufficiently to decide whether to support their children
attending school, legislators could rationally believe that,
because of the nature of divorce and separation, there will be
instances in which children will not receive support from
their parents to attend school precisely because the parents
are divorced or separated, despite the fact that the parents
have the resources to provide the support and it is in the
children's best interest for them to do so. It might be that,
although both parents agree that they should support their
child attending school, they disagree on how much each of
them should contribute, so that one or both of them contribute
nothing. It might be that the nature of the relationship
between the parents is so acrimonious that they refuse to
agree on anything. It might be that the parent who did not
have custody when the child was a minor is unwilling to
provide support precisely because he or she did not have
custody. It might be that one of the parents who, when
married, considered support for his or her child attending
school to be a moral obligation, now considers it to be only
a legal obligation and, hence, that the parent will provide
support only if ordered to do so by a court.58
Challenges stating that the "best interests" standards
unconstitutionally violate noncustodial parents' right to "control and
direct the upbringing of their child" have thus far been unsuccessful.
In Arnold v. Arnold, a father challenged a custody award of 102 days
a year as opposed to 182.5, claiming that the fundamental liberty
interest in equal participation in the raising of his children required
of Awarding Joint Custody of Children, 17 A.L.R. 4th 1013 (1998). Jill Elaine
Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 825, 849 (2004), argues that
despite the rhetoric of "best interests," children in custody cases are too often
treated like property, though her illustrations are from the termination cases rather
than the divorce custody cases.
56. 971 P.2d 469 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
57. Id. at 474.
58. Id. at 475.
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equal placement, and thus that the Wisconsin statute merely requiring
that participation be regularly recurring and meaningful (but not
necessarily equal) was unconstitutional.59 The court disagreed,
finding that he had not shown that the best interests-based statute was
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt: "the facts of this case are
distinguishable from those in Troxel. A dispute between a parent and
grandparents represents a far different dynamic than [a] dispute
between two natural parents with equal rights after a divorce.""
ILL. iH EFFECTS OF JOINT CUSTODY
There is also a practical reason for the best interests as opposed
to the higher compelling state interest for divorce custody cases.
There are simply too many cases for courts to implement the test,6'
59. 679 N.W.2d 296 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 112 (2004).
In the father's brief supporting his certiorari petition, he claimed:
There was no compelling reason to apply "a best interest of the child
standard" before a state can intrude into fundamental right to raise his
children, of a father in a divorced family, while a similar father's role in
an intact family can only be by invaded by a showing of substantial harm.
Brief of Petitioner, David Arnold, at 15, Arnold v. Arnold, 125 S. Ct. 112 (No. 04-
90), 2004 WL 1634531 (July 15, 2004).
60. Arnold, 679 N.W.2d at 299. In the Illinois suit, Urso v. Illinois, 04CV6056
(N.D. Ill. 2004), Judge Kennelly dismissed the case, writing:
Urso's complaint asks this Court to cure a variety of general social
problems by revamping Illinois custody law and to rewrite the decisions
in literally tens of thousands of Illinois state court custody cases by the
stroke of a federal judge's pen, and it therefore does not present such a
controversy, as there is no judicially manageable standard by which this
Court could resolve the issues his complaint poses.
Id. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217, 82 S. Ct. 691, 710 (1962). See
also Eichinger v. Eichinger, 808 N.E. 2d 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 1322 (2005).
61. The Iowa judicial branch web site contains the following information:
63.6% of all the (75,615) civil filings in the district court in 2002 were
domestic relations cases, including 20,071 dissolutions and modifications,
28055 support actions and 6280 domestic abuse civil filings. In addition,
there were 12329 juvenile filings (7022 delinquency, 5234 C1NA, 1924
actions to terminate parental rights (49% increase in two years) and 73
other child welfare matters). On the criminal side, there were 6256
indictable domestic abuse cases. On appeal, 47% of the civil cases
concerned domestic relations, and child custody issues were involved in
over 72% of these.
http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/orders/reports/Annual Report2002amended.doc. Of
course, if using the test meant that in practice all orders would be 50/50 (since
virtually no one could counter the presumption), it would be dramatically easier to
implement and would cut down on court time. I argue that this would run counter
to the proposition that case-by-case determinations are necessary:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses
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while at the same time, the stakes for litigants are extremely high
because custody is "far more precious.., than property rights."
In fairness to all concerned, one of the empirical questions that
should be asked before equal joint custody is presumed is whether it
can be shown to be in the child's best interests.63 If joint custody
presents the best situation for children in all (or most) divorcing
families, a compelling state interest would support the presumption.
Do children in fact fare better, and how would a researcher find out?
The next section of the article, tackles these questions from two
perspectives. First it considers the way children of divorce turn out
as adolescents depending upon different patterns of overnight stays
with their fathers. Second, it examines the changes in various kinds
of costs of divorce once a strong presumption of joint custody is
introduced.
What would an ideal study of the effect ofjoint physical custody
on children look like? First, a large nationwide random sample of
children under various kinds of custody situations, including living
with married parents, would be assembled. They would then be
followed over time and would be observed and tested regularly along
a number of dimensions.' This sort of study has not been done
before. Instead, a special sample of children of divorce has been
asked about their feelings, activities, or mental health
retrospectively.65
the determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly
disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly
risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and
child. It therefore cannot stand.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-657, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1215 (1972). In
addition, as shown infra, there would likely be tremendous costs engendered by
such a change.
62. Mayv. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533, 73 S. Ct. 840, 843 (1953).
63. This seems to be the tactic that has been used by some courts in deciding
against joint custody when the parents were unable to get along. See, e.g.,
Constance v. Traill, 98-2758 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999), 736 So.2d 971, 975 ("We
are not persuaded from the record, viewed in its entirety, that the trial court erred
in finding that equal sharing of physical custody between the two parents was not
in the best interest of these two young girls .... "); Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d
1019, 1021 (N.Y. 1978) ("It is understandable, therefore, that joint custody is
encouraged primarily as a voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable
parents behaving in mature civilized fashion.... As a court-ordered arrangement
imposed upon already embattled and embittered parents, accusing one another of
serious vices and wrongs, it can only enhance familial chaos.").
64. Even better would be an experimental random assignment to the various
custody situations. Obviously this cannot and should not be done in real life.
65. Compare Sanford L. Braver, et al., Relocation of Children After Divorce
and Children's Best Interests: New Evidence andLegal Considerations, 17 J. Fain.
Psych. 206-19 (2003).
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I therefore sought a large longitudinal sample of junior high
school and high school-aged children.66 The National Longitudinal
Study of Adolescent Health was carried out by the Center for
Population Studies of University of North Carolina,67 and contains
many variables of interest including tests and surveys done on
children, questions answered by parents, and information provided by
schools.
I restricted the sample to children living with their mothers
whose fathers lived elsewhere; a large majority of the parents were
divorcCd.", To repeat my goal: a stronger case could be made for
plaintiff noncustodial parents' position if the children who saw their
parents regularly did better. On the other hand, if seeing fathers
frequently harmed the children, mothers or the state might claim that
joint custody harmed the children. The data revealed neither of these
possibilities. What I found was that the worst situation for children
was when they visited their fathers infrequently.69 Otherwise,
however, there was no increase in custodial time that made a
66. See Robert F. Kelly & Shawn L. Ward, Social Science Research and the
American Law Institute's Approximation Rule, 40 Fam. Ct. Rev. 350, 355-59
(2002).
67. Richard Udry& Peter Bearman, The National Survey ofAdolescent Health,
Carolina Population Center, UNC (1994-95). The description, available at
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth, reads as follows:
The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) is a
nationally representative study that explores the causes of health-related
behaviors of adolescents in grades 7 through 12 and their outcomes in
young adulthood. Add Health seeks to examine how social contexts
(families, friends, peers, schools, neighborhoods, and communities)
influence adolescents' health and risk behaviors. Initiated in 1994 under
a grant from the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development (NICHD) with co-funding from 17 other federal agencies,
Add Health is the largest, most comprehensive survey of adolescents ever
undertaken. Data at the individual, family, school, and community levels
were collected in two waves between 1994 and 1996. In 2001 and 2002,
Add Health respondents, 18 to 26 years old, were re-interviewed in a third
wave to investigate the influence that adolescence has on young
adulthood. Multiple datasets are available for study, and more than 1000
published reports andjournal articles have used the data to analyze aspects
of these complex issues. Add Health investigators hope this research will
enable policy makers, researchers, health-care providers, and educators to
better understand how to protect the health of young people in the US.
A description of the research design is available at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/
projects/addhealth/design.
68. There were some children living primarily with their fathers, but too few
(10) to do credible statistical analysis. Those situations were sufficiently different
from the mother-custody ones that using the more common situation seemed
preferable.
69. Table 1 shows that 16.8 % of the fathers saw their children several times
a year.
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statistically significant difference (See Tables 2-5). The only
exception to this rule appears in Table 3, where children seemed less
likely to engage in alcohol, tobacco, and marijuana use if they stayed
with their father several times a month.
A cautionary word about this data (and why it might possibly
overstate the seemingly benign effect of joint physical custody)
comes from the fact that the custody arrangements in the underlying
Add Health study were highly unlikely to have been ordered under
presumptive or mandatory equal custody statutes.7" Since the surveys
were taken in the mid-1990s, the most frequent pattern was joint
legal custody, with a "best interests" standard for physical custody.
In the sample, only eight percent of the children were staying
overnight once a week or more with their fathers.7 A mandatory
joint physical custody situation, particularly an equal one, rather than
an arrangement worked out by the particular parents in individual
cases, is likely to be much less successful.
Now it is necessary to turn to a different look at custody, and
present the effects of a change in custody standards to one which
stresses more equal parenting time, and consider the claims made by
the proponents of the Oregon statutes discussed at the beginning of
this piece: that requiring the court to consider joint custody, stress
parenting plans, provide mediation in contested cases, and allow
streamlined custody enforcement proceedings will better the divorce
process. These claims are testable with other data.
Between 1995 and 2002, there were approximately 125,000
divorces in Oregon.72 As each Oregon divorce was granted, the
70. We do not even know whether the arrangements reported by the
adolescents were those that were court-ordered as opposed to de facto. For similar
cautions, see Kelly and Ward, supra note 66, at 360. Kelly and Ward mention two
large studies finding that in the absence of conflict, more frequent contact with
noncustodial parents is associated with better psychosocial adjustment of children.
Id. at 362 (citing Christy M. Buchanan, Eleanor E. Maccoby & Sanford M.
Dombush, Caught Between Parents: Adolescents'Experience in Divorce Homes,
62 Child Dev. 1008 (1991); Paul R. Amato & Sandra J. Rezac, Contact with
Nonresidential Parents, Interparental Conflict and Children's Behavior, 15 J. Fain.
Iss. 191 (1994)).
71. This is slightly lower than the twelve to twenty-four percent found only
slightly earlier in Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, 4 Future of
Children 121, 125 (1994).
72. An email I received from Joyce Grant-Whorley, Oregon Department of
Vital Statistics (May 18, 2004) (on file with author), shows the following:
1996 14,973
1997 14,880
1998 15,265
1999 15,647
2000 16,583
2001 16,569
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Circuit Court Clerk sent the information to the division of Vital
Records of the Department of Health and Human Services. This
information, more extensive than that collected in most states, 73
included the names, counties of birth and residence of each spouse,
their ages, the dates of marriage, separation and divorce, the identity
of the plaintiff in the divorce action, the number of the marriage for
each spouse, the date and way the previous marriage ended, the
education and race of each spouse, the number of minor children in
the household, and the custody awarded for each child. ! obtained
electronic copies of all this information. In addition, I matched each
divorce to the Oregon Online Judicial Information Network (OJIN)
to obtain specific information about the court proceedings
surrounding the divorce. Since 1991, OJIN has collected case
information from each county's circuit courts and made it available
free of charge at various sites in Oregon, and, for a setup and hourly
fee, to online users elsewhere. 74 The OJIN information allowed me
to collect data for each case on attorney representation, the number
of court incidents (including motions), the amount of fees charged,
whether or not a party alleged domestic violence (including whether
a protective order was issued), whether or not one alleged failure to
pay child support or sought to change visitation or custody, and so
forth. First, I randomly selected 500 cases involving children for
each of the eight years involved (nearly four years before the statute
went into effect in late 1997, and slightly more than four years
thereafter).75 After matching the two electronic databases for the
2002 16,151
In addition, there were 15,329 in the 1995 records sent to the author. The total is
125,397. I selected the following number of cases each year:
1995 462
1996 490
1997 438
1998 485
1999 487
2000 457
2001 493
2002 494
The total number of selected cases (with children in the custody of one of the
parents) is thus 3806.
73. The only other states to continue to collect as much data, since the National
Center for Health Statistics stopped compiling individual divorce data in 1995, are
Connecticut, Montana and Virginia. None of these states have online judicial
records.
74. Human subject review board permission was given for the matching, based
upon names and type of actions that the process required.
75. SPSS, the statistical program, allows a random selection of any given
number of cases. There were in excess of 7000 with children each year.
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random sample of cases, identifying information was deleted from
the files.
Each of the approximately 3,800 cases was coded for a total of
eighty variables, thirty-eight of which came from the divorce
certificates.76 After some files were eliminated (because the court
(OJIN) records were missing or because neither parent received
custody of the children)," data analysis began. Descriptive variables
appear in Table 6. Correlations revealed relationships between
several variables of interest, particularly with whether or not the
couple's separation tookplace after the statutory revisions went into
effect.7" Note that domestic violence petitions are not related
necessarily to when the couple separated, and in fact, may have
occurred as early as 1982. The interesting date, therefore, is whether
the petitions are filed before or after the statute's effective date in
1997. Similarly, we restricted motions to modify or enforce
visitation or change custody to those filed after the divorce. It
therefore became important to know when the couple divorced as
well as when the motion was filed, and a modified Dataset (with a
row for each year beginning at the time of divorce and ending when
the first custody-related motion was filed, up to 2004) was
constructed.
Table 7 tests whether the strengthening of the joint custody
presumption in fact increased joint custody awards. The answer is
that it did, by about thirty percent (see last column). Other large
coefficients come from longer marriages, marriages with fewer
children in the household, and those in which the husband had not
married before (perhaps having other children by the prior
relationships).
Table 8 considers the effect of the change in the custody statutes
on the amount of child support awarded. ' The table shows that
76. All files were cross-checked randomly by a second coder, and those
involving some discretion on the part of the law student involved (such as whether
or not a domestic violence petition resulted in more than a fleeting protective order,
or whether or not mediation actually resolved the case) were reviewed a second
time by the author.
77. In 166 cases someone other than the parents ended up with custody. This
could be because the children were institutionalized, because both parents were
incarcerated, or because at divorce, neither parent wanted to retain custody of the
children and allowed relatives to raise the children. In five cases data about the
children was missing from the divorce certificate.
78. According to Oregon law, statutes ordinarily become effective ninety days
after the date of passage, which in this instance was July 30, 1997. Although
divorce laws and procedures theoretically may be salient before the divorce process,
they will likely effect couples' behavior during and after the divorce process. The
date of separation seemed to be the most approximation we could find in each case.
79. Judgment, unfortunately, cannot be used to address the share of marital
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separation after the custody statute took effect, holding other things
constant, was statistically significantly related to a decrease in the
absolute dollars of child support awards, with a difference of about
eighty dollars a month.80 However, even this turns into a larger net
loss in buying power for the custodial parent because of inflation
during the same time period. The biggest effects (seen in the
Standardized Coefficients of Table 8) are (positively) when the wife
is represented by an attorney and (negatively) when the population
density of the county is high (meaning that higher child support
awards were given in rral areas; quite puzzling since the guidelines
are supposed to be effective statewide and one would guess that the
cost of living would be higher in cities). Although I cannot say for
sure whether wives disadvantaged by the new statute were trading
money for child custody, it is perhaps significant that wives who are
represented do better. Of course, this may simply be another
reflection of the effect of a higher income.
Finally, Table 9 considers whether the legislation increased the
number of motions to modify or enforce parenting time or child
custody. Because these always followed the divorce, the number of
years since the divorce was obviously related, and a modified Dataset
was used that took account for each couple the number of years since
the divorce and up to the filing of such a motion (if one was filed,
otherwise until 2004) was constructed. The answer is that the
number did increase significantly (and almost doubled) following
enactment of the statute. Most of these motions were to change
custody or visitation, not to enforce parenting time.8' The motions to
modify appeared in nearly seventeen percent of the cases, and were,
as one would expect, related to the number of children in the
household. If the desire of the legislation was to make it easier for
unhappy parents to enforce their visitation time, its purpose was
property awarded to the wife. More often than not, instead of a property settlement,
it reflected a judgment for past due child support. The predicted value of joint
custody (from Table 7) was included in the Table 8 regression because joint
custody is endogenous, meaning that it will affect the amount of child support but
will also be affected by many of the same variables, including the law. There is no
better way to combine results from a logit and OLS regression.
80. This holds other things, like joint custody, constant. Considered
independently, support decreased from $370.13 before the statute took effect to
$341.03 afterward. See Table 10.
81. Many more disputes probably occurred that were settled by the parties prior
to judicial intervention. Sometimes, especially in cases where child support was not
involved, there were probably adjustments made to custody arrangements about
which the parties never told the court. In total, 11.5% of the petitions were to
enforce visitation, 39% were to change visitation (parenting time) and 48.8% were
to modify custody. Interestingly, more motions to change custody were filed before
the statute than after it became effective (52.9% compared to 45.2%).
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clearly not met.82 If it was to aid unrepresented litigants, it failed,
since these were importantly and significantly less likely to bring
actions.
IV. A BROADER LESSON?
As we have seen, child custody rules provide legislators (and
noncustodial parents) with tremendous temptation to urge change.
Divorce rules generally seem like a zero-sum game-to the extent
husbands win, wives lose. But when the rule change affects custody
decisions, the possibility for a still greater loss exists for the very
children the parents and the state are supposedly protecting.
Constitutionalizing child custody, or litigating in terms of individual
parents' rights, is likely to harm children in many ways. They may
end up living with a parent more interested in punishing the former
spouse than in doing what the child needs. They may have less
money with which to live, as a child support settlement for lower
than the guideline amount pays off a parent claiming joint custody,
or if ajoint custody solution is ordered but not actualized, or if scarce
resources are expended on pre or post-divorce litigation.83 They may
live the life of peripatetic suitcase-dwellers,84 and even worse, may
be shuttled between parents who actively seek to undermine each
other.85
82. In divorces before the effective date of the statute, motions to enforce were
filed 12.77 % of the time. After the statute, the corresponding value was 10.4%.
83. The level of congestion formed part of the "problems with the system"
cited by the Oregon Task Force on Family Law, Creating a New Family Conflict
Resolution System: Final Report to Governor John A. Kitzhaber and the Oregon
Legislative Assembly, 4, Dec. 31, 1997 (on file with author): "In 1993, more than
one-half of circuit court filings statewide were in family/juvenile law, but refer than
20 percent of the court's resources were devoted to this critical area." Similarly,
the Annual Statistical Report of the Iowa Judicial Branch July 28, 2003, available
at http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/ orders/reports/AnnualReport2002amended.doc,
states "Civil filings in 2002 totaled 75,615-48,126 domestic relations cases and
27,489 law and equity matters."
84. One option is to have the parents do the moving. See the testimony of Dr.
Shuman in Winn v. Winn, 593 N.W.2d 662, 668-69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)
(suggesting that ideally the child would live in the home and the parents rotate in
and out; the court ultimately denied a joint physical custody petition).
85. See, e.g., Murray v. Murray, 2000 WL 827960, 2 (Ct. App. Tenn. 2000):
The parties are equally unhappy with the decision of the trial court, and
both agree that joint custody is not in the best interest of the children.
Interestingly, the trial judge himself stated at the conclusion of the May 12
hearing that 'there is no way that joint custody is going to continue to
work in this case. I don't think it ever really operated or worked,' and
'joint custody is an onerous burdensome method of raising children
between divorced people. It rarely really works.' It is unclear why the
trial judge chose, despite his own grave reservations, to order a joint
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Joint custody may be a fine (and even the optimal) solution if
desired b6y both parents who are willing to work hard towards its
success. Mandatory joint custody, or even a movement in that
direction, seems to cause a number of other problems that perhaps its
proponents did not anticipate. Unfortunately, the biggest winners, at
least in Oregon, seem to be not so much the traditionally noncustodial
parents, but rather the mediators87 and, slightly less dramatically, the
divorce attorneys.
custody arrangement in this case. Perhaps he ruled as he did because of
the difficulty of choosing one parent over another, when both parties
appear from the record to be loving, concerned parents, who are obviously
eager to do their best for the children. In any case, the parties appear to
be in agreement that it would be in the best interest of the children for the
court to grant custody to only one parent. Of course they disagree as to
which of them is the more suitable parent to exercise that custody.
86. See Margaret F. Brinig, Feminism and Child Custody Under Chapter Two
of the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8
Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 301, 314 (2001) (arguing for the replication principle
ofthe American Law Institute Principles ofFamily Dissolution). See also Elizabeth
Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 455, 457-58
(1984) (arguing against a presumption of joint physical custody); Margaret F.
Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring Theories, 73 Ind.
L.J. 393 (1998) (arguing thatjoint custody may give fathers reasons to work harder
on their marriages and more incentives to pay court ordered support).
87. One of the members of the Oregon Task Force with whom I corresponded
was Hugh Mclsaac. In Parents Beyond Conflict: A Cognitive Restructuring Model
for High-Conflict Families in Divorce, 37 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev. 74 (1999),
Hugh Mclsaac and Charlotte Finn describe an education program Mr. Mclsaac ran
during the time period studied in Multnomah County, Oregon (where Portland is
located) for high-conflict families. The abstract notes:
The authors believed many of the difficulties between parents were caused
by the negative perception of the other parent created during the spousal
relationship. They also believed the key to successful co-parenting is to
reframe these perceptions emphasizing cooperation and joint problem-
solving.... Finally, the authors believed parents must learn to separate
conflict in the spousal role from conflict in the parenting role.
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V. TABLES
Table 1. TIMES LAST YEAR KID STAYED WITH BIO DAD
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
.00 NEVER/NA 1097 40.4 48.6 48.6
1.50 ONCE OR TWICE 277 10.2 12.3 60.9
4.00 SEVERAL TIMES 378 13.9 16.8 77.7
10.00 ABOUT ONCE A
MONTH 165 6.1 7.3 85Valid
50.00 ABOUT ONCE
WEEK 158 5.8 7 92
100.00 MORE THAN
ONCE A WEEK 181 6.7 8 100
Total 2256 83.1 100
Missing 99 459 16.9
Total 2715 100
Table 2. Depression (CESD2 19-item Depression Scale) (R2 (adj.) = .047)
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 14.237 1.811 7.863 0
KID AGE AT TIME OF
INTERVIEW 1995 0.194 0.085 0.052 2.272 0.023
KID SEX 1.318 0.278 0.104 4.741 0
HH INCOME IN 1000S -0.004 0.005 -0.017 -0.742 0.458
MOM IS HISPANIC 2.148 2.621 0.018 0.82 0.413
MOM IS BLACK 0.695 0.311 0.05 2.236 0.025
MOM IS ASIAN 0.156 0.938 0.004 0.166 0.868
MOM IS NATIVE
AMERICAN 2.979 1.227 0.053 2.428 0.015
MOM IS OTHER RACE 1.111 0.605 0.04 1.835 0.067
MOTHERS YEARS OF
SCHOOLING -0.311 0.066 -0.108 -4.731 0
MOM AGE -0.021 0.027 -0.018 -0.784 0.433
SELDOM DOES KID
STAY W DAD ONCE OR
TWICE? l=Y, 0 = N 0.671 0.444 0.035 1.511 0.131
SEVERAL DOES KID
STAY W DAD SEVERAL
TIMES? 1=Y, 0 = N 1.33 0.422 0.078 3.153 0.002
MONTHLY DOES KID -0.024 0.573 -0.001
-0.043 0.966
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STAY W DAD SEVERAL
TIMES? 1=Y, 0 = N
WEEKLY DOES KID
SEE DAD MORE THAN
WEEKLY? 1=Y, 0 = N -0.193 0.607 -0.008
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-0.319
OFTEN 0.278 0.587 0.012 0.474 0.635
TALKBIOD TIMES
LAST YEAR KID
TALKED WITH B10
DAD 2.73E-03 0.004 0.018 0.671 0.502
HOW CLOSE HOW
CLOSE KID FEELS TO
BIO DAD -0.595 0.124 -0.13 -4.814 0
Table 3. Drug, Alcohol and Tobacco Use (Times Per Month) (R2 (adj.) =0.80)
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients
Std. Sig.
B Beta
Error
(Constant) -0.685 1.107 -0.619 0.536
KID AGE AT TIME OF
INTERVIEW 1995 0.317 0.052 0.138 6.077 0
KID SEX -0.148 0.17 -0.019 -0.873 0.383
HH INCOME IN 1000S -0.004 0.003 -0.031 -1.349 0.178
MOM IS HISPANIC -1.783 1.721 -0.023 -1.036 0.3
MOM IS BLACK -1.946 0.19 -0.228 -10.245 0
MOM IS ASIAN -1.302 0.581 -0.048 -2.242 0.025
MOM IS NATIVE
AMERICAN -1.48 0.758 -0.042 -1.954 0.051
MOM IS OTHER RACE -1.172 0.368 -0.07 -3.181 0.001
MOTHERS YEARS OF
SCHOOLING -9.07E-02 0.04 -0.051 -2.259 0.024
MOM AGE -2.71E-04 0.016 0 -0.016 0.987
SELDOM DOES KID
STAY W DAD ONCE OR
TWICE? 1=Y, 0 = N 0.419 0.273 0.035 1.537 0.125
SEVERAL DOES KID
STAY W DAD SEVERAL
TIMES? 1=Y, 0 = N 0.429 0.257 0.041 1.672 0.095
MONTHLY DOES KID
STAY W DAD SEVERAL
TIMES? I=Y, 0 = N -0.629 0.349 -0.042 -1.8 0.072
WEEKLY DOES KID
SEE DAD MORE THAN 0.346 0.023 0.936 0.349
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WEEKLY? I=Y, 0= N
OFTEN -0.308 0.359 -0.022 -0.856
1373
0.3921
TIMES LAST YEAR KID
TALKED WITH BIO
DAD -1.05E-03 0.002 -0.011 -0.422 0.673
HOW CLOSE KID
FEELS TO BIO DAD -0.115 0.076 -0.041 -1.516 0.13
Table 4. Juvenile Delinquency (Times Last Month) (15-point Scale) (R2 (adj.)=0.037)
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 16.556 2.098 7.892 0
KID AGE AT TIME OF
INTERVIEW 1995 -0.204 0.099 -0.048 -2.068 0.039
KID SEX -2.395 0.321 -0.166 -7.464 0
HH INCOME IN 1000S -0.009 0.006 -0.036 -1.54 0.124
MOM IS HISPANIC 2.747 3.003 0.021 0.915 0.361
MOM IS BLACK -0.357 0.358 -0.023 -0.997 0.319
MOM IS ASIAN -0.435 1.087 -0.009 -0.4 0.689
MOM IS NATIVE
AMERICAN 1.211 1.406 0.019 0.861 0.389
MOM IS OTHER RACE 1.861 0.697 0.06 2.669 0.008
MOTHERS YEARS OF
SCHOOLING -0.142 0.076 -0.043 -1.872 0.061
MOM AGE -0.017 0.031 -0.013 -0.552 0.581
SELDOM DOES KID
STAY W DAD ONCE OR
TWICE? I=Y, 0 = N 0.372 0.514 0.017 0.724 0.469
SEVERAL DOES KID
STAY W DAD SEVERAL
TIMES? I=Y, 0 = N 0.583 0.486 0.03 1.2 0.23
MONTHLY DOES KID
STAY W DAD SEVERAL
TIMES? 1=Y, 0 = N 5.37E-02 0.66 0.002 0.081 0.935
WEEKLY DOES KID
SEE DAD MORE THAN
WEEKLY? 1=Y, 0 = N -0.162 0.7 -0.006 -0.232 0.816
OFTEN -0.07 0.678 -0.003 -0.103 0.918
TIMES LAST YEAR KID
TALKED WITH BIO
DAD 4.74E-03 0.005 0.028 1.014 0.311
HOW CLOSE KID
FEELS TO BIO DAD -0.584 0.143 0.112 -4.089 0
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Table 5. Morbidity (Chances of Dying or Being Killed Young) (R2 (adj.) =.030)
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0.177 0.046 3.833 0
KID AGE AT TIME OF
INTERVIEW 1995 2.44E-03 0.002 0.026 1.124 0.261
KID SEX 1.15E-04 0.007 0 0.016 0.987
HH- INCOME IN i000S 0 0 -0.035 -1.5 0.134
MOM IS HISPANIC 2.19E-02 0.073 0.007 0.299 0.765
MOM IS BLACK 4.37E-02 0.008 0.125 5.533 0
MOM IS ASIAN 1.46E-02 0.024 0.013 0.611 0.541
MOM IS NATIVE
AMERICAN 5.28E-02 0.032 0.037 1.663 0.096
MOM IS OTHER RACE 5.53E-02 0.015 0.079 3.565 0
MOTHERS YEARS OF
SCHOOLING -0.007 0.002 -0.094 -4.047 0
MOM AGE 2.47E-04 0.001 0.008 0.361 0.718
SELDOM DOES KID
STAY W DAD ONCE OR
TWICE? I=Y, 0 = N 1.74E-02 0.011 0.036 1.539 0.124
SEVERAL DOES KID
STAY W DAD SEVERAL
TIMES? 1=Y, 0 = N 2.36E-02 0.011 0.055 2.201 0.028
MONTHLY DOES KID
STAY W DAD SEVERAL
TIMES? 1=Y, 0 = N 1.38E-02 0.015 0.023 0.948 0.343
WEEKLY DOES KID
SEE DAD MORE THAN
WEEKLY? 1=Y, 0 = N -9.09E-03 0.016 -0.015 -0.584 0.56
OFTEN 6.46E-03 0.015 0.011 0.432 0.666
TIMES LAST YEAR KID
TALKED WITH BIO
DAD -8.44E-05 0 -0.023 -0.816 0.414
HOW CLOSE KID
FEELS TO BIO DAD -6.55E-03 0.003 -0.057 -2.079 0.038
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics
Std.
N Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation
LENGTH OF MARRIAGE 3,786 0.00 36.00 10.24 6.47
CHILDREN IN
3,803 1.00 9.00 1.89 1.04
HOUSEHOLD
WIFE'S AGE 3,743 18.00 61.00 33.90 7.54
HUSBAND'S AGE 3,784 18.00 66.00 36.52 8.03
WIFE'S YEARS OF 3,184 0.00 17.00 12.87 1.99
EDUCATION
HUSBAND'S YEARS OF 3,178 0.00 17.00 12.92 2.20
EDUCATION
WIFE REPRESENTED BYCONE 3,757 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.50COUNSEL (I=YES)
HUSBAND REPRESENTED 3,755 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.48
BY COUNSEL
NEITHER SPOUSEREPR SE 3,755 0.00 1.00 0.41 0.49REPRESENTED (1-YES)
BINARY: WAS THERE A
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 3,788 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.43
ALLEGATION? (1-YES)
BINARY: WAS THERE A
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 3,788 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.41
PROTECTIVE ORDER
ISSUED (1=YES)
FRESOLVED BYREEMEN 3,780 0.00 1.00 0.86 0.34AGREEMENT (1=YES)
FEES CHARGED BY 3,763 0.00 2739.21 302.10 177.94
COURT
INCIDENTS 3,780 0.00 283.00 34.22 28.86
BANKRUPTCY 3,768 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.10
VISITATION OR CHILD
SUPPORT MOTION 22863 0.00 1.00 0.0167 0.12801
(I=YES)(NOTE: POOLED
DATA)
CHILD SUPPORTC A UT 2,795 0.00 6900.00 357.62 464.33AMOUNT ($)
JUDGMENT (USUALLYBACGMCHILDUSUPPRT 3,530 0.00 540000.00 4109.05 23340.27BACK CHILD SUPPORT, S)
HUSBAND PETITIONEDHUSBAND 3,806 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.45(1=yEs)
WIFE PETITIONED
(1=YES)
SPOUSES CO-PETITIONED
3,806
3,806
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(1=YEs)
CONTEMPT ACTIONCN) 3,765 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.28(I=vFS)
RESOLVED BYM EDIN3,740 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.28MEDIATION (1=YFS)
MEDIATION, NOETIONMENT3,741 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.20SETTLEMENT (1=YES)
WIFE HAS CUSTODY(IF 3,806 0.00 1.00 0.61 0.49(1=YES)
tiUSBAND hAS CUSTODYHUSBAND 3,796 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.28(I=YES)
JOINT CUSTODY (1=YES) 3,796 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.44
PER CAPITA INCOME OFCOUT 3,806 16927.00 36356.00 26373.34 4245.41couNT (#)
UNEMPLOYMENT RATEUNTY RAT 3,806 2.20 14.00 6.10 1.95OF COUNTY )
MORE D.V.
ALLEGATIONS THAN 3,797 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22
ORDERS (l=YES)
INCIDENTS/YEARS 2004-
YEAR OF DIVORCE 3,792 0.00 95.50 7.66 7.99
(#/YR)
WIFE LIVES OUT OFSTAE 1 3,806 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.20STATE (I=ES)
HUSBAND LIVES OUT OFSAE LIES 3,806 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.28STATE (I=YES)
VALID N (LISTWISE) 2,058
Table 7. Joint Custody (Cox & Snell R2=.036)
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
SEPARATION AFTER CUSTODY 0.256 0.080 10.324 1 0.001 1.292
STATUTE
LENGTH OF MARRIAGE 0.033 0.006 27.662 1 0.000 1.033
SPOUSE ON WELFARE -0.454 0.143 10.043 1 0.002 0.635
HUSBAND'S NUMBER OF
-0.117 0.071 2.745 1 0.098 0.890
MARRIAGES
PROTECTIVE ORDER ISSUED? -0.721 0.114 40.154 1 0.000 0.486
NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN
-0.099 0.043 5.471 1 0.019 0.905
HOUSEHOLD
CONSTANT -0.970 0.148 42.785 1 0.000 0.379
1376
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Table 8. Child Support Amount (R2 (adj.) =.081)
Standardize
Unstandardized d
Coefficients Coefficients
Std.
VARIABLE B Error Beta t Sig.
separation after effective
-70.832 21.692 
-0.075 
-3.265 0.001
date of statute (1=yes)
children in household 51.570 9.578 0.108 5.384 0.000
wife represented by counsel 165.756 19.115 0.175 8.671 0.000
(1=yes)
incidents/years 2004-year of 6.097 1.209 0.107 5.042 0.000
divorce (#/yr)
either lives out of state 36.400 28.729 0.025 1.267 0.205
(1=yes)
wife's age 2.846 1.400 0.046 2.033 0.042
per capita income of county 0.012 0.003 0.103 4.334 0.000
(#)
population density (#/mile) -0.132 0.026 -0.119 -5.058 0.000
Predicted probability of joint 152.148 136.591 0.027 1.114 0.265
custody (from Table 7)
(Constant) -242.748 79.459 -3.055 0.002
Table 9. Custody/Visitation Motions Following Divorce (Cox & Snell R2=.010; pooled data)
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
divorce after effective date of 0.614 0.121 25.799 1 0.000 1.848
statute
year of custody motion -0.167 0.024 47.923 1 0.000 0.846
neither party represented -0.928 0.126 54.136 1 0.000 0.395
binary- was there a domestic
violence protective order 0.805 0.108 55.832 1 0.000 2.237
issued (1=yes)
bankruptcy 0.774 0.349 4.906 1 0.027 2.168
wife's age -0.044 0.007 35.473 1 0.000 0.957
Constant 3 . 4 4 71 0330.648 48.140 47.177 1 0.000
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Table 10. Mean Values Before and After the Statute Took Effect
Separation Separation
VARIABLE Before Statute After Statute
RESOLVED BY MEDIATION (1=YES) 0.04 0.13
JOINT CUSTODY (1=YES) 0.24 0.30
CHILD SUPPORT AMOUNT (S) 370.13 341.03
BINARY: WAS THERE A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
0.25 0.23ALLEGATION? (I=YES)
BINARY- WAS THERE A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 0.24 0.19
PROTECTIVE ORDER ISSUED (1=YS)
MEDIATION, NO SETTLEMENT (1=YES) 0.02 0.06
CHILD CUSTODY MOTIONS
0.149 0.183
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